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• 
. INTRODUCTION 
••• nor shall private property be taken for public use,
 
without just compensation.
 
-- Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment of the US Constitution 
Until recently, Congress had been content to let the 
judiciary draw the line on takings by deciding when the 
government must pay compensation to private property owners. 
However, some members of the US Congress have proposed new 
legislation which would significantly change the current federal 
approach to regulatory takings. (1) These legislative proposals 
are seeking to replace much of the case law interpreting the 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. Despite judicial decisions 
favoring private property owners in the last few years, many in 
Congress believe that a clear standard on regulatory takings is 
needed, a standard which will better protect private property 
rights in the face of government regulation by reducing the 
amount of property value diminution required before the 
government must compensate private property owners. These 
members believe expanded protection of property rights is 
consistent with the intentions of the framers of the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause. At the heart of the conflict is the 
historical tension between individual rights and the interests 
of the pUblic, or, as some would say, the will of the majority. 
There are no easy answers to this timeless dilemma. 
Recent case law and legislative proposals reflect a general 
hostility toward government regulations, especially those 
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designed to protect the environment and natural resources. 
Opponents of the proposals are concerned that these court 
decisions and pieces of legislation would, if enacted, create a 
cost deterrent to needed regulations. (2) 
Proponents argue that needed regulations would still be 
enforced, but would no longer be "on the backs of particular 
individuals." The government should bear the costs when society 
as a whole benefits from the use of private land. (3) Proponents 
also argue that the costs would not be prohibitive if government 
agencies act efficiently. (4) By inference, acting efficiently 
would mean foregoing regulations necessary for the protection of 
public welfare and safety. The only other option under these 
pieces of legislation and case law would be to compensate 
landowners, because the proposals make compensation mandatory for 
regulations which affect property values even minimally. 
However, both the House and Senate proposals found it unnecessary 
to allocate additional funds for landowner compensation required 
by the proposals. Instead, the money must come from an agency's 
existing budget. This forces government agencies to decide 
between bearing the expense of certain regulations or foregoing 
their promulgation altogether. 
The view that government regulation is overburdensome, and 
interferes with the landowner's ability to prosper is a familiar 
theme. This them to some extent finds its roots in the 
libertarian ideology which advocates the limited role of 
government. In turn, the roots of the libertarian ideology may 
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be found to some extent in the classical philosophy of property 
espoused by John Locke in the late 17th century. (5) Locke 
contended that property rights existed before government and 
therefore government's role is limited to that of protector of 
preexisting individual rights which are inherent in man. Many 
people believe that the libertarian ideology as stated by Locke 
was the inspiration behind the Fifth Amendment, but there are 
still many arguments to contrary. For example, it can be stated 
that Locke's ideas are overly broad and ineffective solution to a 
problem which requires a balancing of the public interest with 
the protection of private property rights. 
The justifications of this new wave of legislation, case 
law, and the underlying ideas about property rights have been 
hotly debated both politically and academically. The underlying 
clash of ideas will no doubt continue as it has for over two 
centuries. Supporters of property rights view the issue of 
"takings" through the perspective of classical property theory. 
This perspective ignores the historical case law and even departs 
from from current case law such as Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council (6). Ultimately, these ideas fail to acknowledge 
that a balance of interest is necessary. Property rights 
propnents claim that protection of private property rights must 
be restored in order to carry out the intentions behind the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause. This contention finds no basis in the 
early case law. A review of the history and development of the 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause through legislation and 
4 
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case law can present more balanced alternatives to the types of 
legislation being presently proposed. We will begin by 
discussing current issues and then move through the history of 
this controversial piece of the Constitution in order to find the 
roots of today's debate. 
RECENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 
The property rights protection bill that passed in the 104th 
House in 1995 is H.R. 925 or the "Private Property Protection Act 
of 1995." House of Representatives 925 falls under the category 
of "compensation" bills as opposed to the "assessment" bills. 
Compensation bills focus on paying the landowner for diminution 
in the value of his or her land. Assessment bills propose a 
"taking impact analysis" by federal agencies before they 
promulgate any regulation which might adversely impact the value 
of private property. 
House of Representatives 925 would affect all federal 
agencies which promUlgate regulations under the authority of 
those acts specified in the proposal. The proposal requires 
federal agencies to compensate anyu landowner whose land value 
has been decreased by 20% or more by such regulation. If the 
diminution reaches 50% of the land value, the landowner can force 
the agency to buy the land outright for "fair market value." 
Additionally, the bill requires only the affected portion of the 
property to be considered in measuring the affect of the federal 
agency action, thus making it significantly easier to obtain 
compensation. Even if the landowner cannot meet the 20'% level 
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of diminution for the entire piece of property, he may make a 
compensation claim for a smaller portion. 
Section 3(B) of this act prohibits indefinitely a restricted 
use for which the agency has paid compensation, even if the 
restriction is later withdrawn. If the agency later rescinds the 
restriction and the landowner wishes to pursue the previously 
restricted use, he or she must repay the compensation with the 
amount adjusted for inflation. In ssence, the government is 
buying from the landowner the particular land use being 
prohibited by the agency action. 
Despite the attempt to clarify this area of law, ambiguities 
would arise if courts encounteres the nuisance exception proposed 
in both bills. Two types of nuisance exceptions exist; those 
which defer to the existing state law and those which are defined 
in the legislation themselves. The House proposal contains both 
types. It requires the avoidance of inconsistency between state 
law and the federal Act. Under this provision, anything already 
prohibited by state nuisance law or local zoning will not be 
compensable. Those courts whcih have traditionally been more 
deferential to state legislatures in the area of land use law may 
find a more expansive definition of public nuisance possible. 
Thus, the bill will likely have a disparate affect on olandowners 
according to thesitus of the property. The second exception in 
H.R. 925 seeks to avoid compensation for the federal prohibition 
of those land uses which would cause a hazard to public health or 
safety or damage to "specific property" other than the regulated 
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property. This may be a difficult distinction for courts to draw 
given the interdependence of land and the broad effect land uses 
are now know to have. 
Additionally, proponents also attempted to pass a bill in 
the Senate that would expand the protection of property rights 
from its current judicial interpretation under the Fifth 
Amendment. The Senate version, S 605 was the second introduced 
by former Senator Bob Dole. Senate 605 or the "Omnibus Property· 
Rights Act of 1995," is more comprehensive than H.R. 925 in that 
it is not limited to compensation but also has an extensive 
provision on agency assessment. In addition, the Senate proposal 
is not limited solely to the coverage of laws aimed at 
environmental protection. The proposal applies to all agency 
regulations regardless of the law under which the regulation was 
promulgated. This proposal also applies to state agency 
regulations required or funded by the federal government. The 
Senate version requires 33% or greater before a property owver 
would be awarded compensation. 
The proposal has five sections, the first of which is the 
statement of findings and purpose. The statement of findings in 
the proposal reiterates the traditional libertarian position of 
property rights advocates. The findings state that "there is.a 
need both to restrain the Federal Government in its overzealous 
regulation of the private sector and to protect private property, 
which is a fundamental right of the American people." The bill 
also states that the Supreme Court's current 
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interpretation of the Fifth Amendment is "ineffective" and 
"costly." The bill attempts to "clarify the law" and "vindicate 
property rights." Title II sets forth the compensation 
provision. Section 204 is somewhat an attempt to codify existing 
law. This section provides for "just compensation" when private 
property is taken or invaded or when the owner is "deprived of 
all or substantially all economically beneficial or productive 
use of the property. This rule is similar to the one 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Lucan v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council. However, the rule as stated in Lucas requires 
that "all economically beneficial use" be prohibited by the 
regulation before a taking may be found on this factor alone. 
The rule state in S. 605 has modified the Lucas "total takings" 
test to include the loss of "substantially all economically 
beneficial use." How much of a loss "substantially all" would 
require is unclear from the proposals, but the rule appears to be 
more in line with the "partial takings" rule articulated in 
Florida Rock Ind., Inc. v. United States, which found a 95% 
diminution in value substantial enough to constitute a taking 
under the Fifth Amendment. Section 204(D) provides for 
compensation when the "fair market value of the affected portion 
of the property" is diminished by 33% or more. 
Senate 605 also establishes a nuisance exception equivalent 
to that in Lucas. The "total takings" test in Lucas is subject 
to one exception. If a landowner is denied all economically 
beneficial use of his or her land, the prohibition 
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must inherein the title itself, in the restrictions that 
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance 
already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an 
effect must "do no more than duplicate the result that could have 
been achieve in the courts, under the state's law of private 
nuisance or by the State under its complementary power to abate 
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise." Thus, 
the government would have the burden of showing that the 
regulation merely prevents a use which would be considered a 
nuisance in accordance with state common law. Whether this will 
have a clarifying effect is doubtful given the uncertainty 
inherent ub tge nuisance exception created by Lucas. 
Authors of the Senate proposal also attempted to make it 
easier for landowners to overcome procedural hurdles which may 
provent court form deciding the merits of certain cases. First, 
they proposed an amendment to the Tucker Act which is seen as an 
obstacle to landowners in seeking judicial relief. Under the 
Tucker Act, the landowner must choose whether he or she wishes to 
challenge the law itself, either facially or as applied, in which 
case the landowner must proceed to Federal District Court. 
However, if the landowner wishes to pursue a compensation claim, . 
he is to proceed in the Federal Court of Claims. The proposal's 
ameendment expands the jurisdication of the Federal Court of 
Claims under the Tucker Act so that the landowner could bring 
actions under the proposed legislation. It would also allow the 
Federal Court of Claims to "grant injunctive and declaratory 
-9 
-_.. ' .....~'-'---. -_._~-
,,~., 
~.;.~'. 
'.'- . .'-­
-.------------­
relief when appropriate" and assert ancillary jurisdiction in 
certian cases. Additionally, under current law there are 
requirements whcih the landowner must meet before the claim is 
considered "ripe." The ripeness doctrine for inverse 
condemnation carses of action is sometimes difficult to overcome. 
The landowner must show that the decision of the governmental 
entity denying the landowner's request for the use of his or her 
property is final and that compensation has been sought throught 
any other channels provided by the land use entity as espoused in 
Williamson County Reg. Planning Commission v. Hamilton. By 
creating an independent cause of action and conferring standing 
on anyone "adversely affected by an agency action," reaching the 
merits of a takings claim would prove much easier. Of course, 
this is only true if a federal agency action, or one mandated or 
funded by the federal government, is at issue. These proposals, 
if enacted, would have a great impact on the federal agencies' 
ability to effect land use management regulations. Although H.R. 
925 was adopted by the l04th House of Representatives, the l04th 
Senate failed to pass any kind of property rights protection 
legislation and it is speculative to presume that similar 
proposals will be presented with any success in future sessions. 
Whether or not further proposals are successful, the ideas which 
these proposals have already brought to the forefront may not 
fade as easily as the political tide which brought them. (7) In 
other words, the view of property rights represented by the 
failed proposals survives. Thus, any concerns which surround the 
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proposals and the view of property rights and the Takings Clause 
should not end with the adjournment of Congress. 
LIBERTARIAN PERSPECTIVES 
The libertarian view of property rights is represented by 
the legislative proposals in more ways than one. First, the 
proposals adopt only those rules which reinforce a limited 
government role in promulgating regulations which affect land 
use. The proposals make the finding of diminution particularly 
easy for the land owner by setting a low percentage level of 
diminution and by allowing the landowner to show that only a 
portion of his property has been diminished. These rules would 
severely limit federal agencies from promUlgating regulations 
which in any way affect" the monetary value of land. By forcing 
the federal agencies to pay for every diminution in property 
value over 20% or 33%, these rules would have in effect forced 
the end of regulation which has up to this point been 
constitutionally permissable. These regulations in many cases 
may still be considered necessary to the public good. 
Proponents contend that regulations causing a decrease in 
private property values are either inefficient or overburdensome, 
and must be paid for. (8) This contention is premised on the 
libertarian view of property rights: the rights of the landowner 
to do what what he see fit with his property as an inherent right 
which should not be abridged by any government action, aside from 
common law nuisance. Any restriction on land use is viewed as an 
imposition upon these God-given rights. 
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Secondly, proponents have asserted that the proposals are n 
line with the original intent of the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause because it is base on libertarian principles. There are 
several instances in the congressional record where supporters of 
this proposed legislation have expressed that at least onel 
reason to enact such legislation is that it is required by the 
libertarian principles behing the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 
Representative Emerson indicated on the floor of the House that 
"clearly the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is one of 
the greatest liberties ever given in the free world. However, in 
recent years, private landowners have seen the Federal Government 
and radical "preservationist" groups infringing on the private 
property rights protected by the Fifth Amendment." 
Representative Hayworth concurred saying, "in supporting this 
legislation, we in Congress have the opportunity to reaffirm what 
Locke referred to as the "root of all liberty" - the right ot own 
property." Representative Tom DeLay also joined saying, 
"ownership of property is a right protected by the Constitution. 
a precious right which should not be infringed upon except in the 
most grave of circumstances. Of course, such statements may be 
more political rhetoric rather than well thought out reasons for 
the proposed legislation. Michael Wolf. in his book Overtaking 
the Fifth Amendment asserts that such statement as the ones made' 
by the Congressmen noted above. are framed to embrace 
Constitutional values, the protection of property rights. and 
free enterprise, are "key rhetorical strategies employed by 
-'. 
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legislative champions of the property rights movement ... " He 
conclude that this "private property offecsive" has targeted the 
Endangered Species Act, but that a more wide ranging attack on 
regulation, ordinance, statutes and even principles of judicial 
interpretation that shield the public at large from extant and 
anticipatied harms. Whether political rhetoric or heart-felt 
beliefs, the statement still express the proponents' view of 
their position. The statement may be a true reflection of why 
proponents support the proposed legislation, and while Wolf and 
others may doubt this, the courts when interpreting legislation 
must presume that these statements represent the true intent of 
the legislature. Thus even a political realist must admit that 
because these statements may effect how a law is later 
interpreted they are of some importance. 
UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHIES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The proponents' contention, that the proposals we have 
discussed are consistent with the original intent behind the 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, depends on the assertion that 
libertarian principles were the basis for this original intent. 
The proposals' restriction on government regUlation or 
interference with the right of land owners are based in the 
libertarian principle of a limited government role and more 
specifically Locke's idea of property as an inherent right which 
deserves protection from intrusion. William M. Treanor is his 
book The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process provides an in depth analysis of the ideology 
13 
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and development of the Fifth Amendment. Treanor contends that 
"the takings clause was intended to apply only to physical 
taking," and points to the Pennsylvania Coal decision as a 
departure from the limitations of the Takings Clause as 
originally understood. Treanor then argues that liberalism was 
not the dominant political ideology at the time of the framing, 
but shared influence with republicanism. He examines James 
Madison's conception of the Takings Clause as support for the 
arguments that the Takings Clause was intended to apply only to 
physical takings and the argument that more than one ideology was 
influential. Treanor then proposes using the translation model 
to develop a current analysis of takings consistent with 
underlying principles. He concludes that "compensation should be 
mandated only in thise types of cases where the political process 
is particularly unlikely to consider property claims fairly." (9) 
These proposals also adopt very libertarian views from the 
current case law, focusing on monetary value rather than the 
balancing of interests which had been pursued through years of 
Fifth Amendment interpretation of regulatory takings. Such a 
grouping of justifications seems to assume that the Fifth 
Amendment rested solely on Locke's view of property rights and 
role of government. The assertion that the Takings Clause was 
based solely on the Lockean view of property may previously have 
been unchallenged, but it is certainly in dispute today. 
Scholars dispute which theories were most influential during 
the framing of the the Fifth Amendment. John F. Beggs. author of 
---- ------- ----------
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several books analyzing the Takings Clause, evaluates the 
historical assumptions made by Justice Scalia and Justice 
Blackmun in Lucas. Beggs argues that oriinal intent behind that 
Takings Clause was not influenced solely by the "classical 
liberal model." Beggs also argues that continuing reliance on 
the framer's intent to resolve the regUlatory taking question is 
misguided due to the evolution of the human condition. (9) Some 
commentators argue that the original intent behind the Fifth 
Amendment was a liberal and expansive view of property rights in 
the face of a potentially overbearing government. Thus, the 
definition of property as used in the Takings Clause willaffect 
the extent to which the Takings Clause will limit legislative 
action. Thus, the definiton should bot promote intuitive 
fairmess and observe the structural limitations on governmental 
power without denying the existence of that power. Accepting a 
"nuisance based" definition of private property would limit the 
legislative ability to redefine property right by manipulating 
the distinction between harm and benefit. This is in line with 
the Founders' desire to protect the individual from overreaching 
majoritarian decisions. This particular argument rests on the 
idea that the line between compensable actions and noncompensable 
action should be drawn according to whether the government seeks 
a public benefit from private property or prevention of a public 
harm. This view of limited Government intrusion with the rights 
of property can be traced to the philodophy and writings of John 
Locke. Locke's political philosophy was of great influence at 
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the time and his views were embraced by many involved in the 
framing of the Constitution. Locke espoused a theory of private 
property rights which was novel for his time. He believed that 
the individual's right to property exists in nature and that 
government should exist only to protect this and other inherent 
rights of man. Locke once said, "Political power is that power 
Which every man having in the state of Nature has given up into 
the hands of the society, and therein to the governors whom the 
society hath set over it self, with this express or tacit trust, 
that it shall be employed for their good and the preservation of 
their property. The counter view to Locke's view is presented by 
James Harrington, who holds the republican view of property. 
Harrington contends that only the distribution of land will 
enable people to be involved in the political process. (10) 
Therefore, land was not thought of a a political right but as a 
political necessity. Property was the means to facilitate 
political balance and avoid the oppression of the minorities by 
the majority. 
The equation of Lockean ideology with the political thought 
behind the Takings Clause is incorrect. While it would be wrong 
to say that Locke has no influence on the founding generation, it 
is equally incorrect to describe Lockean liberalism as the 
ideology of the framing. Thus, the belief that the expansion of 
property rights protection is aligned with the originalist view 
of the Fifth Amendment may be inaccurate. 
16 
COMPARATIVE CASE LAW 
There is, of course, no requirement that legislation follow 
case law. In rare instances, legislation has been enacted to 
reject a specific decision with which Congress was unsatisfied, 
as was the case with the Religious Freedoms Restoration Act. 
However, the development of case law should at least inform 
Congress of the balance of interests which exist. Even if 
Congress chooses to create more protection for a certain category 
of rights, the work of the judiciary in dealing with the balance 
of interests in a difficult area of law should not be cast aside 
without consideration. However, the authors of these proposals 
have done just that. As a result, the authors fail to consider 
the current proposals have done just that. As a result, the 
authors fail to consider the public interst which has influenced 
regulatory takings decisions in the past. 
Now I will examine the early case law on takings, pointing 
out that regulation was not considered significant enough by the 
courts to warrant compensation under the Fifth Amendment until 
the decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon in 1922. The 
development of regulatory takings law and the courts' struggle to 
create a workable standard include the consideration of interests 
on both sides of the issue. While in the fifty years the cases 
have become more protective of private property right under the 
Fifth Amendment, they still have not rejected the need for 
balance between private property rights and necessary regulations 
which represent the public interest. The authors of pro-property 
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legislation have ignored this struggle. The proposals embrace 
the emergence of rules in the recent case law that reflect a more 
restrictive standard for regulations which govern the use of 
land. the proponents have focused only on the portions of the 
case law which support the most protective and thus most 
libertarian ideas about property rights. These ideas, which may 
further protect property rights by making it easier to show total 
diminution or no residual use, such as segmentation and partial 
takings, have appeared in recent regulatory takings cases, such 
as Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States. While current 
regulatory takings decisons may reject the balancing of interests 
present in previous case law, this is true in only the most 
extreme situations, as in Lucas. 
Even if correct about the underpinning of the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause, the current pieces of legislation 
proponent's fail to acknowledge the Takings Clause's evolution 
through judicial interpretation. Early case law decision provide 
no basis for the adoption of the restricted role of government 
with respect to the property rights. Just the opposite is true. 
The early case law did not find it necessary to compensate for 
the impact of government regulation. The early Supreme Court 
interpretation of the Takings Clause extended property protection 
only to physical takings or its close equivalent. In the famous 
case of Mungler v. Kansas the Court reasoned that regulation 
adopted for the protection of the public interest did not 
constitute a taking. The regulation at issue in Mungler was a 
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state prohibition on the manufavture and sale of alcohol. (12) 
Two brewers challenged the regulation claiming that it 
constituted an unconstitutional taking because it rendered their 
breweries valueless. The Court held that the regulatory actions 
of the government did not seriously impinge on the rights of the 
property owners because the state was only limiting those actions 
which were "prejudicial to the public interests." "A prohibition 
simply on the use of property for purposes that are declared, by 
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or 
safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a 
taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. 
Several of the early takings cases are indistinguishable 
from pUblic nuisance cases. In both situations the government 
was allowed to restrict the property owner's use without 
compensation because the government was acting to protect the 
public health and welfare. In these cases, no one claimed that 
the government would have to compensate the landowner. T~e Court 
found the right of the government to restrict certain land uses 
to be inherent in the property interest or a valid exercise of 
the police power. The Court's only inquiry concerned the 
validity of the statute and this was undertaken with great 
deference to the legislature. The Court recognized that "the 
discretion cannot be parted with any more than the power 
itself." (12) 
Now, the public nuisance doctrine and the right of the 
government to exercise its police power fall into different legal 
. "., 
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categories. However, both the police power and public nuisance 
doctrine are derived from the idea that property ownership and 
use dictate the need for balancing the individual's right against 
that of the community. the balancing bacame more complicated as 
the number of land uses expanded along with the number of 
landowners. Government, in adopting regulations that prohibit 
certain land uses in certain areas, necessarily engages in a 
balancing process, considering, among other things, which 
activities are most socially useful. However, the definiton of 
social utility is an evolving notion. 
Traditional case law analysis focused on monetary value, but 
only in conjunction with other factors such as th character of 
the governmental intrusion and the investment-backed 
expectations. In Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, the 
Court found no set formula ikn determining what constitutes a 
taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but instead 
finding that a number of significant factors must be considered 
in each case; including the economic impact, investment-backed 
expectations, and the character of the government intrusion. (13) 
The first case to find that a government regulation violated the 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause was the 1922 case, Pennsylvania 
Coal v. Mahon (14). Pennsylvania Coal dealt with a state statute 
prohibiting the mining of coal, despite ownership, that would 
cause the subsidence of surface property owned by someone other 
than the coal company. The coal company challenged this law when 
faced with an injunction obtained by a private surface property 
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owner and claimed that the regulation resulted in a taking of 
private property. Since this land use regulation was authorized 
by the state, the loss of this coal should be compensated, or the 
statute held invalid. Justice Holmes found that the economic 
impact on the coal company imposed by this regulation was a 
factor in finding that the government regulation in this case 
violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, but was not 
dispositive. ·One factor for consideration in determining such 
limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a 
certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an 
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to susain the act." 
While this case seems to embrace the notion of private property 
rights protection in the face of an overburdensome regulation, 
other factors likely contributed to this outcome. 
One other explanation for this decision is that the Court 
believed that the state was interfering with private contract 
rights. The individual landowners who were losing their homes to 
land subsidence had agreed to sell the support estates to the 
coal mining companies. Thus, the risk of subsidence was inherent 
in the ownership of the surface property .and was probably 
reflected in the prices paid by the surface owners versus that 
paid by the coal companies. The state regulation had gone "too 
far" in this case not only because the state regulation 
interfered with a private agreement. This can be seen in the 
case of Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, which the Court 
distinguished in Pennsylvania Coal, in Plymouth Coal, the state 
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passed a law mandating that a pillar of coal be left between 
adjacent mines for the safety of the mine workers. Here, the 
Court found the law valid becase it was for the safety of the 
mine workers and "secured an average reciprocity of advantage 
that has been recognized as a justification of various laws." The 
mine workers may not have bargained for this additional amount of 
safety, but this imposition was acceptable given that the mining 
company stood to benefit as well. This implies that the thrust 
of Justice Holmes concern may have been the level of government 
intrusion into private contracts and not the percentage of 
property at stake. This created a windfall for the surface 
landowners. In short, the government was reallocating a property 
interest to that handful of people who had knowingly sold their 
rights in the first place. "So far as private persons or 
communities have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only 
surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has 
become a danger warrants the giving to them greater rights than 
they bought" Justice Holmes observed. The argument that 
Pennsylvania Coal is based, at least in part, on the fact that 
the government regulation interfered with private contract rights 
is also discussed in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedictis, decided sixty years after Penn Coal, dealt with a 
similar government regulation restricting coal extraction that 
caused subsidence. The Court in Keystone (16) discussed the 
distinction between the two statutes stressing that the more 
recent statute was not limited to subsidence on private lands, 
22 
but on public lands as well. 
Despite the existence of private contract rights as a 
contributing factor, Penn Coal still set a new precedent for 
regulatory takings. After this case, government regulation could 
violate the Fifth Amendment. But, a claer rule had not been 
articulated and thus courts continued to struggle to find the 
proper balance between private property rights and the public 
interest. 
The next significant case which made progress in stating a 
rule for regulatory takings was Penn Central Transportaton Co. v. 
New York City. This case involved the right to build on top of 
Grand Central Station in New York City. Designated a "landmark 
site," all plans to change the structure had to be approved by 
the city. After two building proposals were denied, the 
station's owner, Penn Central, brought suit claiming these 
denials constituted a regulatory taking under the Fifth 
Amendment. Rather than identify a particular level of diminution 
in value or specific government actions which may be found overly 
intrusive, the Court in Penn Central found, that because of 
important interests on both sides, the consideration of various 
factors was necessary. The Court has recognized the the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee is designed to bar government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness 
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. The Court 
quite simply has been unable to develop any "set formula" for 
determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic 
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unjuries caused by public action be compensated by the 
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on 
a few persons. The Court articulated factors that "have 
particular significance;" the economic impact of the regulation 
on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation interferes 
with investment backed expectations, and the character of the 
governmetnal action. In essence, the Court created a balancing 
test requiring the examination of these articulated factors in 
every case. 
The balancing test articulated in Penn Central continues to 
remain the focus of analysis in questions of regulatory takings, 
except in situations that involve total diminution of all viable 
economic use. You can recognized this in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Comm'n where someone whose land is diminished in value by 
95% will not get the benefit of the categorical rule applied in 
this case, but that finding that an application of the balancing 
test articulated in Penn Central may result in finding a 
compensable taking. During the evolution of the regulatory 
takings law, the Court found no absolute test, short of the total 
diminution test articulated in Lucas, that would fairly evaluate 
the interests of both private property owners and the public 
interest in the regulation of land use. Instead, the Court 
consisitently found that the circumstances in each case must 
determine the outcome. In Lucas, the rule was established that a 
regulation which prohibited all development, and therefore 
decreases the value of the land to zero, went "too far" and 
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compensation was required. Lucas was a developer and bought two 
beach front lots on which to build million dollar homes. "Before 
he sought a building permit, the South Carolina Coastal Council, 
a state land planning agency, passed al law to preserve the 
coastal lands. The law moved the set-back line for development 
to exclude Lucas's lots, prohibiting him from building the homes 
he had intended and causing him the potential loss of the money 
he had paid for the lots (6). 
The South Carolina Supreme Court found no taking even though 
the trial court record established that the value of the land had 
been zeroed by the regulation. The South Carolina Supreme Court 
relied on the purpose underlying the Beach Front Management Act. 
It was designed to "prevent serious public harm" by avoiding 
erosion of the beach that may cause flooding and destruction of 
the homes already in existence there. The justification for the 
Act was the history of problems that plagued the South carolina 
coast in the past, threatening damage and destruction of homes. 
The Supreme Court did not question the underlying purpose 
for the Act or the justifications presented by the state. 
Instead, the Court focused soley on the diminution in value in 
Lucas's land. The Court felt that in situations where the 
landowner was deprived of all development possibilities, and 
therefore all land value, the balancing test need not be 
employed. In such cases, the only important factor is the 
"zeroinng out" of all property value. It did not matter that 
that the state sought to prevent "serious public harm." The 
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Court established a nuisance exception to this per se rule, but 
in doing so refused to accept current legislative definitions 
because any action can be justified as "harm preventing." 
Instead, the regulating bod must now show that the use is 
prohibited under existing state nuisance or common law. 
The authors of the recent legislation we have mentioned have 
failed to consider the difficulty which led the courts to reject 
any absolute test. Proponent ignore the factors articulated by 
the courts in favor of only one consideration: diminution of 
value. First, the legislators ignore the fact that the earliest 
Fifth Amendment cases did not require compensation for mere 
regulatory action. This undermines any argument that the 
proposals are needed to "restore" protection of property rights 
since no significant protection from government regulation 
existed prior to Pennsylvania Coal. The lack of protection in 
the early case law also tends to refute any claim that the 
current case law is not in alignment with the original intent 
behind the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. If that were true, 
the early case law would have reflected this intent, unless the 
early interpretations were completely erroneous. 
Secondly, the legislators ignore the judicial development of 
the balancing test used in cases where the property has not been 
rendered valuless. The Lucas decision recognized that those 
situations involving the depletion of all viable economic use 
were the rare exception, thus implying that a consideration of 
the balancing factors is unnecessary only in those situations 
- -- ----- --
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where the regulatory effect is the most extreme. Yet legislators 
insist that 50% devaluation is significant enough to warrant 
total compensation. This rule rejects even the most protetective 
measures taken by the Supreme Court, one which recognized the 
need for a less stringent rule in most regulatory takings cases. 
The authors of the legislative proposals have not ignored 
the case law altogether. However, they used the current cases on 
regulatory takings as a grab bag of ideas from which they select 
only the ideas which support their notions of property rights. 
Recent years have seen the emergence of new ideas in the case law 
which represent the libertarian view espoused in the legislative 
pieces. First is the notion of segmentation. Segmentation 
shifts the focus in regulatory takings cases from the entire 
property interest to only that portion or right affected by the 
regulation. Property rights advocates use this concept to claim 
further devaluation than would exist if the denominator was 
defined as the entire interest. Second is the concept of 
incomplete diminution, or "partial takings". The effects are 
similar to that of segmentation in that the less diminution 
required, the more protection for property rights. Both of these 
concepts appear in the legislative proposals discussed above. 
The Court in Penn Central rejected the use of segmentation 
as a way to circumvent the interest balancing it had imposed, 
finding that "taking jurisprudence does not divide a single 
parcel into discrete segment and attempt to determine whether 
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated .•. " 
. "d- ;,o:~\_. 
The plaintiff argued that the air space above Grand Central 
Station constituted a separate right that was being taken, and 
thus required government compensation. If accepted, this 
approach would have made it easier for courts to find regulatory 
interference with property rights by focusing only on the use 
which was lost. The proposals would probably accept this 
argument in favor of segmentation. Both H.R. 925 and S. 605 
would allow the landowner to assert a claim for compensation if 
the affected portion of the property is diminished. Since air 
space may be considered a stick in the bundle of property rights, 
it may constitute the affected portion of the property for 
purposes of compensation under the rules state in the proposals. 
The concept of segmentation was reasserted in Keystone v. 
Debenedictis (15). In this case, the Supreme Court evaluated a 
Pennsylvania statute similar to the one found unconstitutional in 
Penn Central. Instead, the Court considered all the holdings of 
the coal company in evaluating the effects of the statute on 
their property interests, finding that only a relatively small 
portion of the interest was a was effected by the mining 
restriction. The Court recognized that the segmentation argument 
taken to its logical extreme would prohibit even the most minor 
government regulation of property: Under the petitioner's theory 
one could always argue that a setback ordinance requiring that no 
structure be built within a certian distance from the property 
line constitutes a taking because the footage represents a 
distinct segment of property for taking law purposes (72). 
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Furthermore, the Court rejected the segmentation argument even in 
light of Pennsylvania's recognition of a support estate as a 
separate property interest, although Pennsylvania property law 
does, or at least it did at that time, recognize the support 
estate as a separate and therefore alienable property right, the 
Court stated "that our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance 
on such legalistic distinctions within a bundle of property 
rights. The Court backed away from this assertion in finding, 
with reliance on determinations made by the Court of Appeals, 
that the support estate's value is merely a part of the entire 
bundle of rights possessed by the owner of either the coal or the 
surface. 
Despite the Court's past refusals to consider segmentation 
arguments, the issue is still unsettled. In Lucas, Justice 
Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court and addressed the issue of 
segmentation in a footnote (6). Scalia expressed disagreement 
with how the Court's decision in Penn Central dealt with the 
issue of segmentation. Scalia stated that because the rule 
concerning the correct "property interest" against which the loss 
of value is to be measured is unresolved, it has created 
inconsistencies in past decisons. Scalia asserts that "the 
answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's 
reasonable expectation have been shaped by the state's law of 
property." Scalia did not attempt to square this opinion with 
the Court's decision in Keystone. However, the issue in Lucas 
did not call for a resolution of this question. 
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It seems that the dicta in Lucas found its mark in the 
Federal Circuit Court's decision in Loveladies Harbor. (11) 
Rather than focusing on the entire development project, the 
litigation in Loveladies concerned only that 12.5 acres for which 
a Corps of Engineers permit had been denied. The Federal Circuit 
Court referred to this as the "denominator problem," recognizing 
that the outcome in many cases would differ depending on what 
portion of the property is considered in the equation. The Court 
found that the decision about what portion of the property 
constitutes the denominator in any given case should be informend 
by the time at which the regulatory scheme was implememnted. The 
court in Loveladies found that the government had not attempted 
to curtail development until after most of the development had 
occurred. Since there was no preexisting regulatory scheme, the 
portion of the land which was already developed should be 
excluded from consideration in applying the current regulatory 
scheme. Thus timing is a key factor in determining what portion 
of a property interest constitutes the "denominator" in a 
regulatory takings analysis. Although it expands the 
segmentation issue beyond prior case law, Loveladies also 
potentially limits the application of segmentation to factually 
similar situations where the regulatory scheme was not in place 
at the time of the original purchase. 
The second idea to emerge in the recent case law, is that of 
"partial takings." This notion holds that a partial diminution 
in value may be sufficient for the court to find, without 
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consideration of other factors, that a government regulation 
violates the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. The partial takings 
issue arose in Florida Rock Industries v. United States, another 
Federal District Court decision. (17) In Florida Rock, the 
plaintiff challenged the denial of a wetlands mining permit 
required under regulations imposed by the Corps of Engineers. 
The claim was first asserted in the United States Court of 
Federal Claims, which found that the permit denial constituted a 
taking under the Fifth Amendment and awarded Florida Rock 
$1,029,000. 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit Court remanded the case with 
instructions to focus on the "fair market value" of the property 
after the permit denial and not just the use denied. On remand 
the Claims Court found the appraisal of Florida Rock, $500 per 
acre, was the correct assessment of fair market value because 
they reflected they reflected the buyer's knowledge of the 
Current regulatory situtation. Given Florida Rock's appraisals 
the land was still not "valueless". The Claims Court found the 
95% reduction in value a sufficient enough to impact on Florida 
Rock's property to find a taking when also considering the 
landowner's inablility to recoup its investment. 
The government appealed again, and the Federal Circuit Court 
instructed the Claims Court to take the government's appraisals 
into account when determining the fair market value. The Federal 
Circuit Court then found that it would be necessary to determine 
if partial diminution would be sufficient to find a taking, and 
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if so, how much diminution was necesarry. The court noted, 
nothing in the language of the Fifth Amendment compels a court to 
find a taking only when the Government divests the total 
ownership of the property; the Fifth Amendment prohibits the 
uncompensated taking of private property without reference to the 
owner's remaining property interests. 
Addressing the "partial takings" issue, the Federal Circuit 
Court found that Lucas implicitly suggested that a less than 100% . 
diminution in value would not necessarily leave the landowner 
uncompensated. However, in Lucas the Court called for an 
application of the traditional balancing test (stated in Penn 
Central) in situations involving less than total diminution. 
Despite this discussion in Lucas, the Federal Circuit Court 
conclusion in Florida Rock was that at some point "mere 
diminution" becomes "a compensable 'partial taking". 
Both segmentation and partial takings are part of the 
broader notion of "conceptual severance (18). This notion 
maintains that property, understood as the bundle of rights to 
which the property owner is entitled, may be broken down into 
individual fragments. The extent of this deconstruction may be 
dependent only upon the conceptual limitation of the ingenious 
property lawyer. The argument is that each fragment should enjoy 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, thus 
immensely increasing the overall protection for private property 
rights. 
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THE NEED FOR BALANCE 
No right is absolute. Even rights to free speech are 
qualified when it comes to the possibility of public harm. 
Different kinds of speech are protected less than others. OUr 
notions of fairness to the individual, values about our society, 
and community standards control the extent to which these rights 
should be qualified. It is always necessary to find a current 
balance of interests, and property rights are no different. The 
debate about land use, government interests, and private property 
rights is as polarizing today as the debate about the propriety 
of seditious libel before the turn of the century. While it is 
easy to see the parallel between the Free Speech Clause and the 
Takings Clause in that both have been controversial and require 
the courts to consider important factors on all sides of the 
debate, this is where the analogy has to end. the factors which 
inform each issue aare the same only to the extent that the 
balance of interest often involve the projection of individual 
rights in conjunction with the prevention of harm to the society. 
The harms are values which must be considered differ greatly with 
each issue. 
The libertarian urge by the courts and the legislature to 
sever property rights into discrete segments reflects an 
individualistic, atomistic view of the world that is out of step 
with life in the last decade of the twetieth century. In an 
increasingly crowded world this reactionary impolse to return to 
a simpler time is understandable, but is inadequate for an era in 
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which interdependencies become more apparent with each passing 
day. 
Recently enacted legislation in Florida demonstrates both 
the need for and feasibility of compensation legislation that 
seeks to maintain a balance of interests. (20) The Bert J. 
Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act (or the 
"Harris Act") is a compromise between environmentalists, the 
property rights movement, and big business. The Harris Act is 
less clear cut and confers less extensive private property rights 
than the federal legislative proposals that we discussed earlier. 
The Act contains a compensation provison but does not attempt to 
establish a quantitative value. The Harris Act is much less 
definite and leaves room for judicial interpretation, prompting 
some to question whether the Act is really much of an advantage 
over preexisting law. The Harris Act creates a cause of action 
for landowners who feel that local government action has caused 
an "inordinate burden" on individual property use. Just what 
constitutes an inordinate burden under the new Act is not clearly 
defined and is left open for a judicial interpretation using a 
balncing of the public and private interests involved. The Act 
does give general guidance, stating that an inordinate burden may 
result when local action causes a permanent loss of reasonable 
investment backed expectations of an existing use or vested 
right. No compensation is given for temporary interferences. 
nuisance abatement, or inordinate burdens which result from 
"transportation activities". 
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As of the completion of this study, there have been no 
reported decisions applying the Harris Act. Several reasons may 
explain this lack of judicial interpretation. First, the Harris 
Act only applies to applications of statutes, rules, and 
ordinances enacted after May 11, 1995. Second, the Act only 
applies to protect a "vested right" or "existing use" or real 
property. Lastly, the Harris Act has a provision requiring the 
landowner to notify in writing the government entity that has 
imposed the alleged burden 180 days prior to filing the suit. 
The government may make a settlement offer during this period. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
With the wave of property rights protection legislation has 
come some recognition by opponents that steps need to be taken to 
remedy those frustrations which have been the impetus of such 
harsh political reactions. Private property rights have been 
burdened by sometimes heavy-handed regulations. The effect have 
been detrimental not only for landowners, but also to the 
advocates of land use planning and environmental protection. It 
does no good to polarize on an issue of such importance. Steps 
need to be taken to avoid alienating landowners to the point 
where destruction rather than coperation becomes more 
individually beneficial. We must find solutions which make more 
sense and whic would help allocate the burden of managed 
restraint and thus maintain the necessary balance between private 
property rights and the public interest. Property rights, 
economic liberties, and other vested rights to many political 
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thinkers were around long before our government was founded. As 
SUCh, the doctrine or vested rights not only precluded 
infringements, but also extended to damaging interference on 
future economic benefits and contractual obigations as well. 
Certainly, the government has compelling interests to balance 
against those of individuals. It is a dilemma that hasn't been 
resolved over two centuries and a clear answer is not on the 
horizon. All due to one small clause in the Fifth Amendment, 
the Takings Clause, which seems to be rather clear to the average 
reader, but has power over the things we hold most dear in life. 
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